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Politics, Prosecutors, and the Presidency in the 
Shadows of Watergate 
By J. Richard Broughton
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps there are no real lessons that are unique to Watergate.  
Political scandal and corruption, after all, were hardly new to American 
politics as of 1972.  Still, perhaps there is something about Watergate that, 
if not different, at least amplifies our understanding of the institutional 
forces at work when government officials seek to extend their authority, or 
engage in scandalous, or even criminal, behavior. 
We know and we see when trouble occurs, or is coming.  After all, 
presidents and other political leaders now have to be presidents and leaders 
on television.  And that reality has been exacerbated, post-Watergate, by 
the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the ubiquity of the Internet and social 
media.  It has been said that Watergate ushered in an era of great 
skepticism about the competence of government, generally, and, when 
combined with the Vietnam War, about the uses of executive power in 
particular.1  That skepticism about executive power arose despite a 
Constitution that needed, and that supplies, an energetic executive2 (indeed, 
from the ashes of Watergate emerged an important tool for presidential 
energy, the executive privilege).3  And that skepticism seems unlikely to 
fade in an era of persistent political news coverage and commentary that is 
capable of reaching the masses instantaneously. 
With respect to the presidency specifically, though, perhaps what 
Watergate accomplished was not merely to make the public skeptical of it 
but, rather, to affirmatively weaken it, to diminish it, to demystify it (and 
hence further weaken it).4  Since Watergate, presidents and presidential 
candidates have consistently narrowed their distance from the governed and 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy.  I am grateful to the Chapman Law 
Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium, and to Whitney Stefko for her excellent work 
in planning and executing the event.  I am also grateful to Stacy Johnson for excellent research 
assistance and to Rachael Soren for her excellent editorial assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 415–18 (1973). 
 2 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 9–14 (1992) (discussing Hamilton’s energetic 
executive and placing it in the context of contemporary conservative presidencies). 
 3 See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 4 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 417–18. For an excellent treatment of the modern 
presidency, see ROGER BARRUS, ET AL., THE DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AMERICA 105–09 (2007). 
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embraced a kind of populism that is designed to show empathy with voters 
and assure the electorate that the candidate can be trusted with power, an 
assurance made all the more necessary in the shadows of Watergate.5 
But a contradiction emerges.  For as the modern presidency has 
become more populist—and more Wilsonian, that is, less constitutional and 
driven to a greater degree by popular opinion6—the President’s power to 
persuade the American people to support his political agenda has been 
emboldened.7  Presidents now regularly appeal to the masses and to the 
public mood, and in doing so they have assumed an ever greater role in 
swallowing up legislative power and dictating the content of national 
legislation.8  Presidential campaigns seem rarely to focus on the formal 
constitutional powers of the office, but instead seem devoted to an 
explanation of a candidate’s proposed political and legislative agenda.9  
Popular leadership, through political rhetoric, has displaced concerns about 
formal powers and institutional arrangements.10  Moreover, public approval 
of Congress has reached record lows: even unpopular presidents remain 
more popular than Congress.11  In a strange sense, then, the post-Watergate 
presidency is in many ways bolder and more pervasive, though often in 
ways that seem at odds with constitutional forms.  The presidency is at 
once stronger and weaker. 
 
 5 See Roger M. Barrus, Politics as Theater: The Presidential Debates, in AMERICA THROUGH 
THE LOOKING GLASS 19–21 (Roger M. Barrus & John Eastby eds. 1994) (describing how empathy 
became an issue at the 1992 Richmond presidential debate, and suggesting that this “fellow feeling” 
was replacing prudence, wisdom, and judgment as the chief qualification for ruling). 
 6 See BARRUS, ET AL., supra note 4, at 105-09 (discussing the constitutional views of Woodrow 
Wilson, who rejected the arrangements of the original Constitution and who wanted a presidency 
grounded in efforts to shape public opinion in order to secure realization of the President’s public 
agenda). 
 7 The “persuasive” power of the presidency was described by Richard Neustadt as the core of 
modern presidential authority. See RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 32–60 (1960). 
 8 See J. Richard Broughton, The Inaugural Address as Constitutional Statesmanship, 28 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 265, 270–71 (2010) [hereinafter Broughton, The Inaugural Address]. I also 
previously argued that presidents have used the veto power to achieve this result. See J. Richard 
Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS 91, 118 (2005). 
 9 See Broughton, The Inaugural Address, supra note 8, at 265–66. 
 10 See generally JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987). 
 11 Recent public opinion polling, for whatever it is worth on its face, demonstrates consistently 
lower public approval of Congress (understood, presumably, as it is constitutionally: the House and the 
Senate). According to one website that collects and posts data from various national polls, Congress’ 
approval at the start of 2012 averages somewhere in the low teens. See Congressional Job Approval, 
REAL CLEAR POLITICS, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-
903.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). According to the widely-respected polling of Gallup, the two-year 
approval rating of Congress averaged 25% in 2009–10, and 23% in 2007–08. See Lydia Saad, 111th 
Congress Averaged 25% Approval, Among Recent Lowest, GALLUP POLITICS, (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/145460/111th-Congress-Averaged-Approval-Among-Recent-Lowest.aspx. 
By contrast, as of the first week of February 2012, President Obama’s approval rating was 47%.  
Throughout most of his presidency, his approval numbers have remained low; his lowest was 38% in 
October 2011.  The average for his term is 49%, as of February 2012. See Obama Job Approval, 
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Job-Approval-Center.aspx (last visited Feb. 
20, 2012). 
Do Not Delete 8/2/2012 9:31 PM 
146 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:1 
My focus is on those constitutional arrangements and the kinds of 
politics that accompany them.  I consider them here in the context of one 
particular aspect of executive power that arises in the shadows of 
Watergate and the fears of executive power and an Imperial Presidency that 
followed: the scope of federal prosecutorial power and discretion.12  The 
Constitution, I argue, embraces a strong criminal justice presidency. But 
these are formal powers that presidents and presidential candidates hardly 
discuss these days.13 
Generally speaking, prosecutorial power is, and has been recognized 
by the judiciary as, a core executive power.14  But the scope of the current 
federal prosecutorial regime is not the product of presidential 
aggrandizement.15  Congress, particularly since Watergate, has continued to 
expand the scope of the federal criminal law.16  In doing so, Congress has 
created an ever-growing menu of charging options for the federal 
prosecutor, enabling federal prosecutors to leverage more guilty pleas and, 
as thoughtful scholars have observed, exert tremendous ability to both 
control the scope of substantive federal criminal law17 and act as de facto 
final adjudicator of criminal prosecutions.18  Moreover, courts have not 
 
 12 See infra pp. 8–12. 
 13 See infra pp. 12–14. 
 14 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 467 (1996); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
691 (1988); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). The Court’s most vocal adherent to this 
proposition is Justice Scalia. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
“Governmental investigation and prosecution of crime is a quintessentially executive function.”). Note 
also Justice Scalia’s observation that prosecuting a crime is not part of “the judicial power” under 
Article III. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 816–17 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 15 See Katy J. Harringer, Executive Power and Prosecution: Lessons from the Libby Trial and the 
U.S. Attorney Firings, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 491, 492–94 (2008). 
 16 Numerous scholars have described the ever-increasing “federalization of crime.” See generally 
John S. Baker, Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal 
Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 548–54 (2005); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s 
Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 610 
(2005); Gerald Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 
789, 801–04 (1996); Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 868 (1996); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: 
Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 503, 505 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals Am. Acad. 
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 157, 158 (1967). I relied upon this literature in another recent piece, as well. See J. 
Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 457, 
458–66 (2012). But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 Cornell J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 247, 249–52 (1997) (arguing that commentators complaining of overfederalization overlook 
the federal government’s steady decline in criminal law enforcement, as well as substantive areas that 
ought to command a greater federal enforcement role); Susan Riva Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, De-
Bunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2050081 (disputing the connection between the growth of federal criminal law 
and the exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion). 
 17 See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549–50 (2004); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]. 
 18 See Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from the 
Administrative State, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 878 (2009); see also Angela Davis, The American 
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offered any meaningful limits on prosecutorial discretion.19  The result is a 
body of about 4,500 federal criminal laws,20 many of which are written too 
broadly, often without meaningful mens rea elements,21 and often for 
activities that cause either minimal social harms or that are more properly, 
and constitutionally, regulated by state law.22  This massive body of law 
has given rise to, in Rachel Barkow’s words, “the Prosecutor as 
Leviathan.”23  The executive power of prosecuting crimes has appeared to 
metastasize into substantive lawmaking and adjudicative power, as well. 
How can this happen in a post-Watergate world that was supposed to 
be so solicitous of limits on executive power? 
One response is to suggest that, at least for some crimes, broad 
prosecutorial authority is desirable as a method of combating the kinds of 
social harms and public corruption that Watergate involved.24  However, 
another response is to say that Watergate was concerned not so much about 
executive power writ large, but about presidential power in particular.25  
The key to this distinction is to view the federal prosecutor as politically 
independent, an executive actor perhaps but not one who acts at the 
direction of the President.  Indeed, making the Justice Department “de-
politicized,” politically independent, and free of political control has been a 
constant theme in the post-Watergate era.26  In light of the Saturday Night 
Massacre of October 20, 1973, the theme inspired the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978
27
 and the independent counsel provisions that 
were so controversial but upheld in Morrison v. Olson.28  The theme also 
 
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 (2001) 
(describing the power of modern prosecutors and advocating prosecutor review boards as a check). 
 19 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 365 (1978). 
 20 See Memorandum from John S. Baker, Jr. of Heritage’s Center for Legal and Judicial Studies 
(June 16, 2008). 
 21 See generally BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, THE HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L 
ASS’N. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL 
INTENT REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW (2010). 
 22 Id. at 24–29. 
 23 Barkow, supra note 18, at 874. 
 24 See Harringer, supra note 15, at 492-93. 
 25 See Archibald Cox, Watergate and the Constitution of the United States, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 
125, 126–27 (1976); Ruth P. Morgan, Nixon, Watergate, and the Study of the Presidency, 26 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 217, 229 n.1 (1996). 
 26 See, e.g., Raising the Standards at Justice, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 1988, at 20 (praising President 
Reagan’s appointment of Dick Thornburgh to replace Ed Meese as Attorney General, despite 
Thornburgh’s partisan political background, and claiming that the Justice Department is “in shambles” 
after Meese’s tenure); James Vicini, Gonzales Seen as Politicizing Justice Dept, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com (citing sources claiming DOJ politicization under Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales). 
 27 See Ethics of Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591– 599). 
 28 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988).  Notably, by contrast, John Manning argued that 
the removal provisions of the independent counsel law actually permitted presidential removal in the 
event that the independent counsel acted in defiance of a presidential order. See John F. Manning, The 
Independent Counsel Statute: Read “Good Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1288 
(1999). 
Do Not Delete 8/2/2012 9:31 PM 
148 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:1 
inspired other (unsuccessful) proposals to make the Justice Department and 
federal prosecutors politically independent.29  We saw this political 
independence theme again in the wake of the 2007 United States Attorneys 
firings scandal in the Bush Justice Department,30 and more recently in 
criticism of the Obama Justice Department,31 both of which drew the 
attention of the political opposition in Congress.32  Indeed, current House 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith of Texas recently issued a 
report describing the Obama Justice Department as “more partisan than 
ever.”33  It seems that “politicization” of the Justice Department has been a 
regular complaint in official Washington for years. 
The theme is sensible as far as it goes.  Of course we do not want 
politically motivated criminal prosecutions.  That is, we do not want 
prosecutors to exercise discretion based simply on whether the criminal 
suspect is a Republican or Democrat, or a political rival of the prosecutors 
or the administration.  Nor do we want federal prosecutors to decline 
legitimate prosecution of an administration official merely because he fears 
 
 29 See, e.g., Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 
2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 1-3 
(1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics] (statement of Sen. Ervin) (concerning Senator Ervin’s proposal 
for making the Justice Department an independent agency); Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act 
of 1975, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong. 4 (1976) (concerning 
proposal for temporary special prosecutor recommended by the Attorney General); see also CORNELL 
W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL 
POLICY 236 (1992) (arguing that the Justice Department has become “the primary and most effective 
weapon in the quest to aggrandize presidential power” and this is reason for reconsidering the proposal 
to make the Department politically independent). 
 30 See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 369, 371 (2009); David M. Dreisen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 
709 (2008); Marisa Taylor, New Attorney General Has Rebuilding Ahead; Depoliticizing Office Seen as 
Priority, LEXINGTON (KY) HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 2, 2007, at A7; Editorial, New Attorney General: 
Mukasey Should Chart Independent Course for Justice Department, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 
2007, at 16A. 
 31 See Hans A. von Spakovsky, A Politicized Justice Department Strikes Again, NATIONAL 
REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
blogs/print/274805 (stating “it should come as no surprise that this politicized Justice Department is 
willing to abuse federal law to suppress anti-abortion views”); Hans A. von Spakovsky, Politicizing the 
Law, NAT’L. REV. ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/228943 
(criticizing Civil Rights Division for using enforcement powers to benefit ideological goals of 
Democrats). In an interview with television and radio host Sean Hannity, former Justice Department 
lawyer J. Christian Adams discussed a book he recently authored and asserted that what was occurring 
in the Obama Justice Department was “not just politicization.  It’s radicalization . . . .” See Hannity, Fox 
News Channel, Transcript of Interview with J. Christian Adams, available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/hannity/2011/10/05/radicalization-obama-justice-department (October 
4, 2011). 
 32 See, e.g., Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Justice Dept. Politicizing the Hiring 
and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (June 1, 2011). 
 33 THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DISREGARD OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW, 
REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 112th Cong. (Apr. 30, 2012), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Reports/ 
AG%20Report%20Final-Final%204%2028%2012.pdf. [hereinafter CHAIRMAN’S REPORT OF APRIL 30, 
2012]. 
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retribution by the President or the President’s political appointees, or 
because he does not want to create a political problem for the otherwise 
prosecutable individual.  The Public Integrity Section of a Justice 
Department in a Republican presidential administration should not seek 
indictment of a Democratic governor merely because that governor is a 
political opponent; a United States Attorney appointed by, and with close 
ties to, a Democratic President should not pursue charges of corporate 
criminality against a company merely because it was a major Republican 
campaign contributor.  And, presidents and prosecutors should be sensitive 
to public perception that they are engaged in rank partisanship. 
But beyond this, our vision of an apolitical federal criminal 
enforcement regime is clouded, for there are many ways in which politics 
and legitimate political considerations affect the role, scope, and duty of the 
federal prosecutor.34  Properly distinguishing partisanship and politics, 
Dahlia Lithwick and Jack Goldsmith have rightly argued that politics is 
“inevitable in the enforcement of the law” and that this may be beneficial, 
at least in the sense of promoting accountability.35  Moreover—and I would 
say inevitably in Washington politics—some allegations of using the 
Justice Department as a partisan weapon will naturally flow from the 
President’s political opposition no matter how legitimate the Department’s 
actions.36  After all, these kinds of allegations tend to come with the hope 
of partisan gain for the political rivals who lodge them.  So just as the 
Department should be sensitive to claims of partisanship, the Department 
also should not avoid a legitimate prosecution or other relevant action 
merely because the President’s opponents find some way to accuse him of 
politicization.  We often hear about the “criminalization of politics,”37 a 
phenomenon worth sober consideration.  But we should also take an 
interest in the politics of criminalization, or to be more precise, the politics 
of criminal lawmaking and prosecution. 
Perhaps the ultimate question is about who really controls the exercise 
of prosecutorial power.  One would have thought that a post-Watergate 
America would have definitively answered this question by now.  And yet, 
the question remains open, and scholars—particularly after Morrison v. 
Olson—vigorously debated this question.  I need not resolve that question 
in this brief project.  I simply suggest —as I have in other contexts38—that 
in the context of the federal prosecutorial regime we need not necessarily 
choose between a strong President and a weak Congress, or a weak 
 
 34 See Dahlia Lithwick & Jack Goldsmith, Politics as Usual, SLATE, Mar. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/ 
politics_as_usual.html. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See Edwin M. Yoder, The Presidency and the Criminalization of Politics, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
749, 749 (citing then-recent examples of the phrase’s use). 
 38 See J. Richard Broughton, Judicializing Federative Power, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 283, 314–
15 (2007); Broughton, The Inaugural Address, supra note 8, at 287. 
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President and a strong Congress.  We can, and should, have appropriate 
(which is to say constitutionally-proscribed) strength in both political 
branches.  The formal powers of both political branches inform the role of 
the federal prosecutor at the level of constitutional and ordinary politics.  
This essay therefore uses federal prosecutorial authority after Watergate as 
a case study in the embrace (though they remain distinct) between the legal 
and the political. 
I.  THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTORIAL CONTROLS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PRESIDENCY 
 
In a post-Watergate world, as we have witnessed, the suggestion of 
involving the President in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be 
thought to roam too far in politicizing the Justice Department and the 
notion of impartial criminal justice.39  But the constitutional presidency 
leaves quite a bit of room for presidential influence over the enforcement of 
criminal law, often in ways that will intersect with political considerations.  
So beyond the formal arrangements that support the case for presidential 
control over the federal prosecutorial regime, ordinary politics also inform 
the criminal justice presidency, even as presidents carry out their 
constitutional functions.  Presidents, after all, are not immune from the 
“tough on crime/soft on crime” dichotomy, however meaningless that 
dichotomy may be in enforcing and administering criminal law. 
To be sure, some scholars have argued compellingly against the notion 
of broad or exclusive presidential control over federal prosecutors as a 
matter of our constitutional history.40  But perhaps the most comprehensive 
response to this account comes from Saikrishna Prakash, who persuasively 
uses both text and early constitutional history to argue that the Constitution 
favors presidential control.41  Starting from a historical context in which the 
Crown had control over prosecutors, he notes that early presidents 
consistently assumed direct control over the work of local federal 
prosecutors.42  Moreover, Prakash argues that the text and structure of the 
Constitution favor presidential control.43  Indeed, the textual and structural 
 
 39 See supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
 40 See generally Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
 41 Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 521 (2005). For 
another excellent historical account of presidential perspectives and practices related to control over law 
enforcement, see generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
(2008). 
 42 Prakash, supra note 41, at 527; see also John Yoo, George Washington and the Executive 
Power, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (2010) (describing Washington’s view of executive 
control over law enforcement and explaining that Washington thought his authority as Chief Executive, 
combined with the Take Care Clause, “gave him the power and responsibility to carry out federal law.  
This included directing anyone, regardless of his position, who might participate in enforcing the 
law.”). 
 43 Prakash, supra note 41, at 537–46. 
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aspects of Prakash’s Chief Prosecutor Thesis form a substantial part of the 
legal basis for the criminal justice presidency that I describe here (though 
in my view the criminal justice presidency is more than merely the sum of 
the constitutional parts, and includes the political components of a 
President’s influence over the federal prosecutorial regime). 
The very notion of “executive power,” all of which is vested in a 
single President,44 offers support for broad presidential control of federal 
prosecution.  The intellectual history of executive power—of which there is 
no better scholar than Harvey Mansfield—suggests that the term was used 
throughout political philosophy to mean, in substantial part, executing the 
law, which included the punishment of criminals.45  Of course, our 
constitutional separation of powers owes more to Locke and Montesquieu 
than to perhaps any other political thinkers, adding the power of judging to 
the taxonomy.46  In our system of separated powers, judges and juries 
adjudicate criminal cases and impose sentences.47  But, though Mansfield 
explains that  Montesquieu’s judicial branch may have softened preceding 
understandings of executive power by separating the power of judging and 
making it explicitly independent of political power (thus separating politics 
from criminal punishment),48 neither Montesquieu nor other expositors of 
executive power displaced the authoritative power of the executive to 
decide when and whether to identify criminal wrongdoers and place them 
into a system overseen by independent judges.  So while judges in our 
system may ultimately decide and impose criminal sentences, the decision 
of whether to employ the coercive power of the state against a wrongdoer 
remains where it was in the earlier taxonomies: with the executive.49 
The “executive power” that is vested in the President thus includes 
significant criminal justice responsibilities, which are the core components 
of the executive power, though not its sum total.50  Presidents often carry 
out these responsibilities based on political values that may differ from 
other presidents.  Notably, the President is specifically commanded to “take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”51  But let us consider Take Care 
Clause politics.  After all, the President performs this duty, in significant 
part, through a system of lawyers at the Justice Department, among them 
federal prosecutors.52  Presidents appoint the enforcers of the criminal law: 
the Attorney General, United States Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorneys 
General who head the relevant divisions of the Justice Department, 
including the Criminal Division and other divisions that have a hand in 
 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 41, at 430–31. 
 45 See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD JR., TAMING THE PRINCE 102-07, 130-35 (1993). 
 46 Id. at 290. 
 47 U.S. C.ONST art. III, § 1. 
 48 MANSFIELD, supra note 45, at 216. 
 49 See Prakash, supra note 41, at 539. 
 50 Id. at 540. 
 51 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Prakash, Chief Prosecutor, supra note 41, at 539–40. 
 52 See Prakash, supra note 41, at 539–40. 
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criminal prosecution.  Those appointments may well reflect the 
enforcement preferences of the President: for example, a United States 
Attorney who shares the President’s desire for rigorous drug enforcement, 
or an Attorney General who is committed to prosecuting political 
corruption or corporate criminality or criminal offenses related to civil 
rights.  To highlight this point with just one historical example, President 
Reagan “consistently named to key positions in the department individuals 
committed to his political objectives.”53  These appointees then “effected 
important changes in the status quo that illustrate how an administrative 
presidency is effectively pursued through a particular department.”54 
In addition, other contemporary practices within the Justice 
Department reveal that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is affected 
by a President’s political preferences.55  Enforcement priorities may shift 
depending upon the political viewpoint of the President.56  One President 
may be an advocate for greater attention and resources devoted to violent 
crimes and terrorism, while the next President may prefer that greater 
prosecutorial resources be shifted to environmental crimes, financial 
crimes, or public corruption.  Examples are numerous, but a few will 
suffice here.  For one, as Eastland again explains of the Reagan Justice 
Department, obscenity prosecutions were rare until Reagan’s second term, 
when prosecutions increased substantially.57  The increase “was a policy 
change, reflecting the President’s concerns,” resulting in the creation of a 
new litigating unit in the Criminal Division to handle obscenity offenses.58  
President Obama recently offered another high-profile example when, in 
the course of his January 2012 State of the Union address, he indicated that 
he was requesting that the Attorney General form a special unit of federal 
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute criminal law violations arising 
from the mortgage lending scandal.59  These political preferences also 
become manifest in the legislative and policy choices that the Department 
makes, such as when the Department’s Office of Legal Policy advocates 
new legislation, including criminal legislation, that is often a product of the 
President’s political agenda in relevant areas of enforcement.60  Even when 
 
 53 See EASTLAND, supra note 2, at 155 (emphasis added). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. at 155–56 (explaining the issue of segregation in school presented “an opportunity for 
the Justice Department to replace an inherited law enforcement practice with one reflecting the new 
President’s views”).  
 56 See id.  
 57 Id. at 157–58. 
 58 Id. at 158. The unit is now known as the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS). 
See The United States Department of Justice, Exploitation & Obscenity Section, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/. 
 59 See Barack H. Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/ 
01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
 60 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.23 (2011) (detailing duties of the OLP, one of which is to work to “secure 
enactment” of legislative and policy goals of the Department and Administration); see also Margaret H. 
Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation, 16 GEO. 
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enforcing the Principles of Federal Prosecution found in the United States 
Attorneys’ Manual,61 the Justice Department’s enforcement priorities 
inform prosecutorial decision-making, and again, those priorities often may 
reflect the political preferences of the White House.62  As the commentary 
to the provisions for “substantial federal interest” indicate, the federal 
prosecutor should consider national investigative and enforcement 
priorities when exercising his or her discretion about whether to bring a 
charge.63  Faithfully executing the law within the arena of prosecutorial 
discretion thus includes what Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have 
called the President’s “completion power,” because the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion includes “policy determinations about how best to 
implement”—to complete—a statutory program of criminal law.64 
Moreover, it is important to remember that prosecutorial discretion is 
as much a check itself as it is something to be checked.  The power to 
decide whether and what charges to bring can just as well function as a way 
of counteracting a Congress that has drafted criminal legislation poorly, 
unconstitutionally, or overzealously.65  Prosecutorial discretion can thus 
serve as a check on the politics that can produce problematic criminal 
laws.66  This kind of decision-making inheres in the obligation to preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution, to faithfully execute the Office of the 
President, and take care that the laws are faithfully executed—
complementary powers that not only belong constitutionally to the 
President but that coalesce in the world of controlling prosecutorial 
discretion.67  Faithful execution, after all, requires the President to take 
some measure of the validity of a law he is being compelled to execute, 
including the power—again when combined with his obligation to the 
Constitution and to his office—to deliberate upon the constitutionality of 
the laws and refuse to execute those that contravene the Constitution.68  For 
 
IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 293 n.121 (2002) (noting that OLP “is the focal point for developing Justice 
Department initiatives that advance the President’s agenda”). 
 61 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.001 (1997). 
 62 See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime From Task 
Force to Top Priority, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 982 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he U.S. Attorneys are 
appointed by and serve at the discretion of the President of the United States”); see also Brian A. 
Cromer, Prosecutorial Indiscretion and the United States Congress: Expanding the Jurisdiction of the 
Independent Counsel, 77 KY. L.J. 923, 941 (1989) (explaining that “federal prosecutors cannot be 
depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence in contravention of the President's wishes.”). 
 63 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.230. 
 64 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 
2293 (2006). 
 65 The decision not to prosecute has not been subject to particularly rigorous examination in the 
criminal justice scholarship.  But for an excellent recent discussion of discretion not to prosecute, see 
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2011). See generally 
Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (2003) (empirically examining decisions not to prosecute). 
 66  See infra Part B. 
 67 See Saikrishna Bangladore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 
96 GEO L.J. 1613, 1616 (2008). 
 68 See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 
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example, suppose Congress passed, and a prior President signed into law, 
legislation making X a crime, even though that legislation is clearly 
unconstitutional.  Can Congress demand that it be enforced anyway?  
Could Congress enact a provision demanding that prosecutors seek 
indictments pursuant to the legislation?  My point here is that it would 
make little sense to invest a President with power to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the laws if he cannot authoritatively order his executive 
branch subordinates not to enforce those laws that he deems to be 
unconstitutional.69 
Constitutionally, the President also has the sole power to grant 
pardons and reprieves, a key ingredient of the criminal justice presidency 
and one so broad that it is constitutionally limited only in two minor ways: 
presidents can employ it only for offenses against the United States and not 
in cases of impeachment.70  While the breadth of the power means that it 
may be subject to political abuses,71 it can also be used to further a 
President’s legitimate political goals or to reflect a President’s moral values 
expressed politically.72  The President can grant clemency to persons 
convicted of crimes that the President views as unjust or unconstitutional, 
or whose sentences are inconsistent with a President’s view of just and fair 
sentencing policy.73  This, too, represents a meaningful control over the 
work of federal prosecutors by affirmatively undoing the legal 
consequences of the conviction or punishment for which the prosecutor’s 
office had fought and invested considerable resources.  Of course, as is 
often the case, the President  will exercise his judgment as to the pardon or 
reprieve in favor of an individual who was prosecuted under a previous 
administration, thus allowing the President to give conclusive effect to his 
political differences with his predecessor. 
 
200 (2004); Prakash, supra note 67, at 1616–17; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1280 (1996). 
 69 Sai Prakash has argued that this is actually required. See Prakash, supra note 67, at 1616–17. 
 70 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447–48 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (explaining that “without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice 
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel” and that this power is best placed in the hands of a 
single man, “a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of the government than a body of men”). 
 71 See Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 
285 (1993); see also Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1666–69 (2001) (describing controversies surrounding pardons granted by 
President Clinton during his final days in office); Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: 
Lessons of Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185 (2003) (examining the Clinton pardons from 
a process-based perspective). 
 72 See Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
253, 280 (2010) (explaining that “the founding generation understood the Pardon Clause to mean that 
when an offense properly falls within its terms, the decision whether to grant clemency would be 
subject largely to the constraints of the political process and the President’s own personal sense of 
moral integrity.”). 
 73 See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1169 (2010).  Moore, supra note 71, at 286–88. 
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Finally, the politics of federal prosecution can emerge in the context 
of presidential rhetoric.74  Of course, recent presidential campaigns have 
rarely focused upon issues of crime and punishment. With a recent decline 
in crime rates,75 and national politics focused on either economic 
conditions or international terrorism, recent sitting presidents also have not 
made criminal justice policy a regular talking point.  This has been true 
despite the criminal justice presidency I have described here, in which 
criminal law enforcement and administration are among the chief duties of 
the head of the executive branch.  But as the presidency has become 
increasingly rhetorical,76 and as presidents make their case for political 
preferences to an ever-growing swath of the rhetoric-consuming public (not 
simply in person, but now electronically in more diverse ways than ever 
before), presidents can benefit politically from talking more about criminal 
justice matters.  It is preferable that political rhetoric about prosecutorial 
preferences occur in the context of the President’s formal institutional 
responsibilities, such as in an address to Congress, in signing or vetoing 
criminal legislation, or in formally recommending criminal legislation.77  
But regardless of the political or institutional context in which the rhetoric 
is voiced, the expression of such views in the context of political rallies, 
campaigns, or other public speeches can produce and inform the kinds of 
policies that prosecutors will be asked to pursue on behalf of the President. 
A strong case thus exists for a criminal justice presidency that inheres 
in the constitutional presidency and that, in practice, functions not simply 
as a political control over federal prosecutors but also as a way to view the 
impact of ordinary politics upon the everyday work of prosecutors.  Even if 
prosecutors and other criminal justice professionals in the Government do 
not view themselves as carrying out partisan objectives, they should 
nevertheless understand that the nature of their work is determined in 
substantial part by the political sensibilities of the President under whom 
they serve.78  This arrangement surely seems inconsistent with the political 
independence theme that emerged after Watergate and that arises from time 
to time in modern politics.  Yet it is one that the constitutional system 
embraces. 
 
 74 See Obama, supra note 59 (illustrating President Obama’s discussion of prosecution in his 
State of the Union Address); see also JEFFREY K. TULIS, REVISING THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY, IN 
BEYOND THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3 (Martin J. Medhurst ed., 1996). 
 75 Preliminary Semiannual Uniform Crime Report, Jan.-June 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/preliminary-annual-ucr-jan-jun-2011 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011); see 
also Falling Crime Rates Challenge Long-Held Beliefs, NPR (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/01/03/144627627/falling-crime-rates-challenge-long-held-beliefs. 
 76 See TULIS, supra note 10, at 4. 
 77 Id. at 13. 
 78 See Cromer, supra note 62; see generally Prakash, supra note 41. 
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II.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLITICS IN THE CONGRESS 
Even as there are persuasive arguments that existing constitutional 
formalities provide for strong presidential controls over the federal 
prosecutorial regime, this does not make Congress impotent as to that 
regime.  It would be unwise to overlook the controls on the work of 
prosecutors and on the criminal justice presidency that derive from 
Congress’ institutional powers—and that also can be deeply political.  
Congress usually empowers the criminal justice presidency and the 
prosecutorial regime that resides in it.79  But Congress need not always do 
so, and there is evidence that greater constraints are worth pursuing in light 
of the scope of federal criminal law and the vast authority of modern 
federal prosecutors. 
The very creation of criminal law by legislation is a political act.80  
The motivations for creating and defining crime may not be, indeed hardly 
ever are, distinctly partisan.81  But criminal legislation, as much as any 
other kind of legislation, is motivated by preferences about good social 
order, justice, and moral desert–preferences that are often subject to dispute 
among reasonable people.82  Beyond a small core of federal crimes, there 
are very few crimes that Congress has created which are universally 
accepted as legitimate.83  Consequently, choosing whether to make 
something a crime means that the lawmaker must take sides on these 
disputes about preferences, and this creates the likelihood that he will, at 
least in some measure, consider his own potential political gain.84  In 
modern parlance, “tough on crime” beats “soft on crime”,85 and that 
political factor, as much as anything, helps to explain the current size of 
federal criminal law.86  And as federal criminal law demonstrates, this 
political act of crime-creation has substantial consequences for the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.87 
 
 79 See Krent, supra note 40, at 282–85; see also Jack M. Beerman, Congressional Administration, 
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 158 (2006) (explaining that “Congress is intimately involved in the 
execution of the law, both formally through legislative and other controls on the executive branch and 
informally through oversight, investigations, direct contacts, and other political methods”). 
 80 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 780 (2006). 
 81 Id. 
 82 For thoughts on the factors related to the aims of the criminal law that influence legislative 
decision-making, see generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. 
L. REV. 453 (1997). 
 83 See id. at 475. 
 84 See Stuntz, supra note 80, at 850. 
 85 See Broughton, supra note 16, at 470–71. 
 86 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn From the 
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 523–24 (2011). 
 87 Although he does not deal exclusively with federal prosecutors or federal legislative politics, 
Bill Stuntz offers a keen analysis of the relationship between politics constitutional law, and criminal 
law enforcement.  Among other insights, Stuntz argued that the constitutional law of criminal procedure 
had the effect of making political discourse, and the resulting substantive criminal law, “too punitive, 
racially divisive, and insufficiently attentive to the liberty and autonomy interests that constitutional law 
allegedly protects.” Stuntz, supra note 80, at 850. In his other writing, however, Stuntz also explains 
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As we have seen, after all, the story of contemporary federal criminal 
law is a story of continued expansion.88  More criminal laws means more 
potential prosecutions, which means more federal resources devoted to the 
exercise of prosecutorial power.  It means greater overlap with state crimes, 
so that federal prosecutors are challenged more often to decide whether, 
consistent with the Department’s Petite Policy, to prosecute a federal crime 
after a completed or contemplated state prosecution arising out of the same 
acts or transactions.89  This results in greater pressure on the Justice 
Department, when enforcing internal policies, to determine which interests 
are both “substantial” and “federal,” and whether they are worth pursuing 
through criminal prosecution.90  And as the menu expands, (and with the 
elements in the Government’s favor), with the Government pursuing more 
prosecutions, historical practice demonstrates that an overwhelming 
number of cases will result in guilty pleas.91  Ever harsher punishments 
then aggrandize the phenomenon.  That is, in many cases, even though 
judges hand down the ultimate sentences, prosecutors can persuasively 
recommend punishments that are harsh, and the availability of such harsh 
sentences only enhances the power to leverage pleas.92  Prosecutorial 
discretion thus metastasizes along with the increased scope of the criminal 
law.  Although the judiciary occasionally steps in to police procedural 
misconduct by prosecutors,93 or to either strike down or narrow the reach of 
a substantive criminal law,94 courts generally do not police prosecutorial 
discretion.95  The separation of powers provides ample reason not to do so.  
But as a result, this arrangement inevitably exerts pressure on political 
actors—members of Congress, who are the creators—to exert some control 
 
why there are particular kinds of political pressures that apply to federal lawmakers. See Stuntz, 
Pathological Politics, supra note 17, at 545–49. 
 88 See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 17, at 508. 
 89 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-2.031 (2007). 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Barkow, supra note 18, at 879; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 56 (1997). 
 92 See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal 
Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 717–18 (2006). 
 93 See, for example, the district court’s order in the corruption prosecution of former Senator Ted 
Stevens. United States v. Stevens, 715 F.Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Special Proceedings, 2011 
WL 5828550 (D.D.C. 2011), as well as the district court’s order requiring the government to pay 
$600,000 in defense legal expenses as a result of prosecutorial misconduct in the Southern District of 
Florida. United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 94 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (striking down on First 
Amendment grounds federal criminal law punishing depictions of animal cruelty); Carr v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2232–33 (2010) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) applies only to 
present or future travel in interstate commerce, not to travel that pre-dated the law’s enactment); 
Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102, 2107–08 (2009) (holding that Congress did not intend 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b) (2006), which makes it a felony to use a communication facility to facilitate certain 
federal drug crimes, to apply to a person who uses a cell phone to obtain possession of a controlled 
substance in an amount that would only constitute a misdemeanor); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 551 (1995) (holding Gun Free School Zones Act unconstitutional as violation of Commerce 
Clause). 
 95 See Barkow, supra note 18, at 869. 
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over the law and the process, not simply to empower prosecutors but also 
to combat prosecutorial overreaching. 
The problem, however, is that Congress rarely does so.96  Of course, 
the conventional—and I think largely accurate—explanation for this is, in 
fact, a political one.  Legislators see no political upside to reducing the 
scope of the criminal law or in advocating reduced punishments for 
convicted criminals.97  Again, the “tough on crime” label trumps all else. 
Examples abound, but political crimes offer a useful model for 
considering the matter.  Most of the attention scholars have given over the 
past two decades to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 deals with the 
independent counsel.98  But that law also added new criminal provisions 
related to lobbying and financial disclosure by public officials and federal 
employees.99  Many prosecutions though, do not even rely on criminal laws 
specific to political corruption.100  Some of the most popular items on the 
prosecution’s menu for fighting public corruption include the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO);
101
 the Hobbs Act;102 
mail and wire fraud,103 and honest services fraud;104 and finally—what is 
perhaps the new “darling” of the federal prosecutor105—the false statements 
statute.106 
Yet along with this expanded menu has come the enhanced danger of 
prosecutorial overreaching.107  And this danger arises whenever the 
Congress enacts poorly-crafted legislation, such as legislation that is vague 
or ambiguous or unclear as to the mental element that the government must 
prove.  In fact, to provide just one recent example, the proclivity for 
 
 96 Id.; see also Richman & Stuntz, supra note 16, at 610–11 (describing the increased demand for 
federal criminal jurisdiction among agencies and observing that “Congress has been all too happy to 
meet that demand, especially in the past generation”). Professor Krent also argues that the modern 
Congress has, as a matter of practice, simply acquiesced in the executive’s efforts to control law 
enforcement, and that this practice “masks the historical conflicts [between Congress and the executive] 
that have taken place.” Krent, supra note 40, at 311. 
 97 Barkow, supra note 18, at 869; Richman & Stuntz, supra note 16, at 610; Broughton, supra 
note 16, at 470–72. 
 98 The literature on the independent counsel provisions is extensive.  For thoughtful examples, 
see Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
463, 463-65 (1996); see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Putting Law and Politics in the Right Places – 
Reforming the Independent Counsel Statute, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 169 (1999). 
 99 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (2006) (criminalizing certain communications between former 
government employees and the offices that employed them). 
 100 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); 18 
U.S.C. § 1343 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).  
 101 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006). 
 102 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) (criminalizing robbery or extortion, including extortion under color of 
official right, that in any degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce). 
 103 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341–1343 (2006). 
 104 18 U.S.C. §  346 (2006). 
 105 See Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (stating that conspiracy is “that 
darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery”). 
 106 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2006). 
 107 See Barkow, supra note 18, at 874, 876–77. 
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overreaching had become so strong among federal prosecutors in honest 
services cases that the Supreme Court had to step in to narrow that statute’s 
application in cases of public corruption.108  In light of the (too) often 
poorly crafted menu that Congress has created and expanded, and in light 
of the otherwise anemic limits on discretion, it appears as though the most 
effective way to restrict the use of discretion without implicating the 
separation of powers would be to simply remove an item from the menu 
altogether. 
The very political arrangements that produce criminal sanctions, then, 
are also the same ones that produce the risks and realities of oversized 
prosecutorial power.  But just as Congress has used its institutional tools to 
(usually) empower the prosecutor’s office, Congress also has the 
institutional tools to constrain it, even outside of the context of repeal or 
code reform.109 
As I have argued elsewhere, Congress could use its investigative and 
oversight powers more aggressively,110 to examine, for example, 
presidential enforcement priorities and their consistency with congressional 
priorities, or the exercise of discretion in specific cases that have been 
adjudicated.  In 2009 and 2010, a House Judiciary subcommittee held 
hearings on over-criminalization and over-federalization, at which 
members expressed their concerns about the state of federal criminal law.111  
In addition, following criticisms that arose at the 2009 and 2010 hearings 
concerning the current scope of federal criminal law, the House is currently 
considering legislation—H.R. 1823—that would consolidate all federal 
crimes into Title 18 and eliminate overlapping and duplicative crimes.112  
And both the House and Senate have conducted oversight hearings on the 
application of the federal death penalty to examine the factors that drive the 
Justice Department’s review, and the Attorney General’s decision-making, 
in potential capital prosecutions.113  These moves presumably reflect 
considered political judgments about the scope of federal criminal justice 
power and the uses and functions of the criminal law. 
 
 108 See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010) (holding that the honest 
services fraud statute covers only bribery and kickback schemes, not mere undisclosed self-dealing). 
 109 See infra notes 115, 117 (citing statutes constraining prosecutorial discretion). 
 110 See Broughton, supra note 16, at 479–99. 
 111 See Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2009); Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions, Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. (2010). For a fuller description of these hearings, see Broughton, supra note 16, at 473–79. 
 112 See Criminal Code Modernization and Simplification Act of 2011, H.R. 1823, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 113 See, e.g., Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong., June 27, 2007; Death Penalty Reform Act of 
2006, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). I note, in the interest of disclosure, that I assisted Justice Department 
leaders in preparing for each of these hearings during my time at the Justice Department. 
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Also, in a few instances, Congress has attempted to use the substantive 
statutory criminal law to constrain the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.114  For example, the contempt of Congress statute requires the 
United States Attorney to convene a grand jury once the relevant chamber 
has approved the contempt citation.115  In a more recent example, when 
Congress passed the new hate crimes legislation in 2009,
116
 it included a 
provision which prohibits a federal prosecutor from bringing a prosecution 
pursuant to the new law unless the Attorney General has certified that the 
State lacks jurisdiction; the State has requested that the United States 
assume jurisdiction; the verdict or sentence in State court has left the 
federal interest in bias-motivated violence “demonstrably unvindicated;” or 
a federal prosecution is “in the public interest and necessary to secure 
substantial justice.”117  This provision is essentially an effort to codify the 
Justice Department’s internal policies on prosecuting cases where there is 
the potential for a dual state prosecution, but now (at least as to hate crimes 
cases under this new law) those policies have the force of a congressional 
command, rather than internal policy that the Department could change at 
any time without congressional approval. 
Congress has also successfully asserted its prerogatives to protect 
itself under the Speech or Debate Clause,118 which, although limited to acts 
that are part of the “due functioning” of the legislative branch,119 is an 
explicit method of limiting prosecutorial power.  It favors Congress in a 
conflict between the legislative institution and the prosecutorial apparatus 
of the executive, which may be politically hostile to an individual member 
or to Congress more broadly.120  Most recently, in United States v. Rayburn 
House Office Building, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit found that the FBI violated the legislative privilege 
when it searched Representative William Jefferson’s Capitol Hill office and 
seized materials that were considered “legislative” for purposes of the 
Speech or Debate Clause.121  This had the effect of preventing prosecutors 
from both accessing and using the protected materials, though the 
prosecution of Representative Jefferson was ultimately successful anyway 
on the strength of other, independent evidence.122  Note that by protecting 
the “legislative” acts of speech or debate, which the Court has construed 
 
 114 See infra notes 115, 117 (citing statutes that limit or mandate prosecutorial action). 
 115 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 192, 194 (West 2005). 
 116 See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, codified at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 249 (West 2009). 
 117 18 U.S.C.A. § 249(b)(1)(A–D) (West 2005). 
 118 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 119 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 513 (1972); see also Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman’s 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) (reaffirming that the Clause extends to members and their aides acting 
within the “legitimate legislative sphere”). 
 120 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966). 
 121 U.S. v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 122 David Stout, Ex-Rep. Jefferson Convicted in Bribery Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at 
A14.  
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broadly to effectuate its purpose,123 and by protecting not only 
Representatives and Senators but also their aides,124 the Clause has the 
practical effect of favoring politics (as practiced within certain institutional 
boundaries) by placing a fair amount of ordinary politics beyond 
prosecutorial reach.  
And finally, the House and Senate retain the power of impeachment 
and conviction, respectively.125  One of the important lessons of Watergate 
was that the existing constitutional scheme actually provided a political 
mechanism—impeachment—for dealing with the abuses of the Nixon 
White House.  Similarly, if Congress determines that the President is 
politicizing criminal prosecution in ways that obstruct or threaten the 
integrity of the American criminal justice system, it always has the 
mechanism of impeachment.126  And this mechanism is as much a political 
act as it is a legal one.127 
Of course, these kinds of institutional controls on the Justice 
Department will often raise separation of powers concerns.  For example, 
even when Congress attempts to use its investigative and oversight powers 
against the Justice Department, it is not uncommon for the Department 
officials to assert some privilege that would protect executive branch 
information from disclosure.128  And it is debatable whether Congress can 
use the contempt statute to prosecute a high-ranking White House aide for 
refusing to answer questions before a congressional committee, even where 
that committee is investigating possible corruption of the federal 
prosecutorial regime.129  Moreover, if criminal prosecution is a core 
executive function subject to exclusive control by the President, then 
although Congress can define the criminal law and oversee the executive’s 
program of enforcement, any effort to direct the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion would violate the separation of powers.  This theory would raise 
some constitutional doubt regarding the charging directives in, for example, 
the new hate crimes law.  But the formal arrangements that supply these 
various powers contemplate conflict; and conflict between the political 
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branches is good.130  And often these conflicts—like those involving 
executive privilege, for example, or application of the contempt statute to 
White House officials—are resolved not by legal doctrine or court 
intervention, but by the forces of political muscle and political 
accommodation.131 
CONCLUSION 
This short essay has, of course, only skimmed the surface of some 
important issues of constitutional and ordinary politics related to the 
control of the federal prosecutorial regime at a time when the federal 
criminal law appears, often intolerably, super-sized.  But the essay 
demonstrates that the regime is one that both of the political branches have 
an interest in controlling and that existing institutional arrangements are 
adequate for doing so, even when—in fact, particularly when—those 
arrangements may often place political forces and preferences at 
loggerheads. 
Of course, one response to this suggestion is—and has been—to give 
ultimate control neither to Congress nor to the President but to 
affirmatively make the Justice Department independent of each.132  We 
have seen numerous proposals of this kind since Watergate, from Senator 
Sam Ervin’s initial proposal to make the Justice Department an 
independent agency,133 to Garrett Epps’ more recent argument for making 
the Attorney General an independent elected official.134  Yet those 
proposals have not gained wide public acceptance or even wide 
congressional support.135  As Nancy Baker has argued, a close relationship 
between the President and the leadership at the Justice Department may be 
essential for developing sound legal policy and for ensuring political 
accountability.136  And as Lithwick and Goldsmith explain, these proposals 
present their own set of dangers, which we could avoid by allowing 
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“Congress, the press, and the people to be the check here. . . . If politics 
turns out to be the illness here, politics will also prove the cure.”137  I have 
attempted to follow these sensible critiques of a politics-free prosecutorial 
regime with some elaboration: existing constitutional arrangements—
including a criminal justice presidency and a Congress that serves as the 
starting point for federal criminal law—contemplate healthy politics in this 
regime, and those same arrangements can adequately oversee, and combat 
excesses and improprieties in, prosecutorial decision-making.  These 
arrangements function best, however, when the political branches take 
seriously the assertion of their own prerogatives, not on behalf of party but 
of institution. 
None of this is to say that criminal law enforcement should be 
politicized, in the sense of permitting party affiliation or private political 
gain to animate prosecutorial decision-making.  The Justice Department, 
the Attorney General, and the Bush Administration more broadly were 
surely sullied by the United States Attorney firings scandal, just as the 
Obama Justice Department may well suffer from the ongoing criticism that 
it has permitted partisanship to trump evenhanded law enforcement.138  
There remains much to be said for preserving both public confidence in the 
politically impartial administration of criminal justice and the reputation of 
federal prosecutors as devotees of the rule of law.139  But the effort to 
divorce criminal law and its enforcement entirely from politics is a fool’s 
errand, and unwise.  And perhaps this is as it should be.  The Constitution 
establishes a workable system in which political actors influence the 
structure and functioning of criminal law enforcement.140  While it does so 
by creating a cooperative arrangement whereby executive actors enforce 
the law that legislators pass, it also does so through institutional 
arrangements that pit political forces against one another.141  And that, if 
anything, is the real legal legacy of Watergate: institutions with separate 
constitutional functions and constitutional identities robustly asserting their 
respective prerogatives to prevent encroachments and ensure political 
accountability.  This, I suggest, is a legacy worth embracing, as it embodies 
the American rule of law. 
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